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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
)
Plaintiff and Respondent
" Case No.
)

v.

12038

CHARLES R. KNOWLES,

Defendant and Appellant

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE
OF THE CASE
The Defendant - Appellant, Mr. Charles R.
Knowles, having been convicted of obtaining property
under false pretenses on the 13th day of September,
1967, was thereafter granted a new trial, which we assume was subsequently revoked, and instead of the new
trial the Defendant was granted a stay of execution
and placed on probation. Over two years later, on De1

cember 17, 1969, a hearing was held wherein the Defendant was ordered to show cause why his probation
should not be revoked.
The Defendant appeals from the result of this
hearing and from certain errors in the proceedings which
were a gross violation of the Defendant's right to due
process in Judicial Proceedings.
DISPOSITION IN LOV.'ER COURT
The hearing on the order to show cause why probation should not be revoked resulted in Defendant's
probation being revoked and the Defendant being committed to the Utah State Prison. From this result the
Defendant appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks reversal of the order revoking
probation and reversal of the order committing him to
prison where he is presently being held against his will.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Mr. Charles R. Knowles, the Defendant-Appellant, was convicted on the 13th day of September, 1967,
of obtaining property under false pretenses. Upon conviction, the trial court found sufficient grounds for
granting a new trial. And the record shows no formal
2

revocation of this order for new trial, but, apparently,
the judge was persuaded by the Deputy District Attorney to place the Defendant on probation rather than
allow the new trial. During this time, Defendants connsel withdrew from the case, and the Defendant, being
impecunious, was left without adequate counsel.
The Defendant was placed on probation subject to
the supervision of the Adult Probation and Parole Department and remained in good standing with said Department for more than two years since the date of original conviction. On the 19th day of November, 1969,
the Defendant was ordered to appear and show cause
why his probation should not be revoked. The grounds
for such order was an affidavit executed by Arthur J.
Beverage, the Defendant's probation officer, wherein
it was alleged that the defendant, " . . . did have in his
home on or about November 13, 1969, stolen property
valued at $50.00, knowing the same to be stolen."
The matter came regularly on for hearing before
the Honorable Merrill C. Faux, one of the judges of
the Third Judicial District, at 10 :30 a.m., on W ednesday, December 17, 1969. At said hearing, Salt Lake
County Deputy Sheriff, Michael Hanks, testified that
he telephoned the Defendant's wife and told her that
Salt Lake County Deputy Captain, Pete Hayward was
enroute to the Knowles' residence with a search warrant and that the Defendant's wife should remove from
the house any stolen property. Said statement was made
by Deputy Hanks, knowing the same to be false. The
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The Defendant's wife instinctively trying to protect her
husband and father of her five children from any possible trouble, (not knowing of anything stolen, but being
led to believe by the phone call that there was some
stolen property in the house), gathered up several articles which she did not recognize for sure as property
of her husband or herself and placed them in a vehicle
and drove away from the home.
While on the public street the vehicle was stopped
and without probable cause or the formality of arrest,
Deputy Hanks searched and seized the contents thereof.
At said hearing, Deputy Hanks was allowed to
testify, over the objections of Defendant's Counsel, as
to whether the property was in fact stolen and from
whom it was stolen without personal knowledge as to
these facts. Also, Deputy Hanks was allowed to testify
over objection.s of Counsel, as to the actual value of the
property in question, again, without personal knowledge
of such facts.
The Defendant was denied requests to confront
alleged owners of said property. Also, Defendant was
denied request for production of said property in order
to be able to rebut and refute allegations of the State.
The Defendant was not even allowed to examine the
alleged inventory list of the alleged stolen property.
Each attempt by the Defendant's counsel to object
to abuses of due process in the judicial proceedings was
overruled.
4

At the conclusion of the hearing, the Defendant's
probation was revoked and his personal liberty was denied by his committment to the Utah State Prison.
The Defendant appeals from this gross abuse and
violation of his individual rights.

ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION TO DECIDE IN PROBATION HEARING.
Part A. The court had no jurisdiction to hear
or rule on the matter of Probation because a new
trial had been granted and no revocation of
order granting new trial appears in the record.
On the 13th day of September, 1967, Defendant
was convicted of obtaining property by false pretenses.
(Official Record p. 37) Becaulie of certain irregularities at trial and because of new affidavits available
which were contrary to testimony received in trial and
on other grounds which the trial judge found sufficient,
a motion for new trial was granted and the order for
new trial was entered on 26th day of February, 1968.
(Official Record p. 46.)
There is no timely or formal order revoking or withdrawing the order for new trial in the Official Record
filed with the Clerk of Supreme Court of Utah, 24th
day of March, 1970. Thus, it appears the court granted a new trial but none was ever had. Instead, the De5

fendant was placed on probation, which the court at that
point had no jurisdiction or power to do because in fact
a new trial had been granted returning the Defendant
to position in which he was before the original trial on
conviction. Utah Code Annotated 77-38-2 states that
"The granting of a new trial shall place the parties in
the same position as if no trial had been had." Consequently, without jurisdiction to deal with the probation of the Defendant, the hearing and its determination are void.
Part B. Once a new trial has been granted,
Revocation of order granting new trial is error
as it is beyond the power of the Trial Judge.
Admittedly, various jurisdictions are divided on
the issue of trial court's power to revoke, modify, or,
with original order granting new
in general,
trial once it has been formally entered. However, it was
early established in this jurisdiction in the case of Luke
v. Coleman, 38 U. 383, 113p 1023, (1911), that the
Court has no power to reopen the question of granting
a motion for new trial after once disposing of it. In the
Luke v. Coleman case, supra, the Court cited various
California cases as similar to ours and stated that in
California, the trial court does not have the power to re·
open the question of granting or denying a motion for
new trial after previously disposing of it.
The California Court has since had the opportunity
to rule on and refine this point of law several times,
and the result is expressed in the case of People v. Pay·
6
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sen, 123 Cal. App. 396, 11 pbd 431, 193, ( 1932), and
People v. Hanks, 35 Cal. App. 2d 290, 95 P2d 478,
(1939). People v. Hanks, supra, states, "It is well settled in this State, that once a motion for a new trial has
been ruled upon in a criminal case and an order made
either granting or denying such application . . . the
Court is without authority to entertain a subsequent
motion the object of which is to change or vacate the
former order."
And the Texas Court in Jones v. State, 51 Tex.
Crim. Rep. 3, IOOS.W. 150, (1907), held that after a
motion for a new trial has been granted by the trial
court "the case stands as it originally stood, that is, for
trial," and the trial court is without authority to revoke
its order for the new trial. The Texas Court arrived at
the same conclusion in Ex Parte Alexander, 129, Tex.
Crim. Rep. 500, 89 SW 2d. 411, ( 1936).
POINT II. THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO
DUE PROCESS OF LAW 'VAS VIOLATED
BY THE MANNER IN WHICH THE HEARING FOR REVOCATION OF PROBATION
WAS CONDUCTED.
Part A. The trial court erred in admitting
evidence which was obtained in violation of Defendant's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment
Right of Protection from unreasonable Search
and Seizure.
The articles of property which the State alleged as
stolen were taken from the Defendant's wife without
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probable cause and without arrest or warrant for such
search and seizure. Deputy Michael Hanks testified at
p. 64 of the record that he ,stopped the Defendant's wife
and seized certain articles from the back of the vehicle
which Defendant's wife was driving, and that he did not
have a search warrant.
In Chimel v. Califorwia, 395 U.S. 752, (1969), the
court held that a search without a warrant could not
go beyond the area wherein the person might have obtained a weapon or obtained evidence that might be
used against him.
In the instant case the Defendant's wife was not
arrested, the officer had no probable cause to arrest, no
search warrant was had, and Defendant's wife was not
advised of any of her rights. This conduct was "unreasonable" under the Chimel v. California, supra, doctrine and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the Constitution. And the use of the articles of prop- '
erty obtained by this illegal seizure as evidence in the
hearing was a violation of the Defendant's rights.
Part B. The court erred in admitting hearsay
testimony prejudicial against the Defendant.
Throughout the hearing, Deputy Michael Hanks
was allowed to testify, over the objection of Defendant's Counsel, as to what items were in fact 'stolen' and
what value the items had, when he had no personal
knowledge of this fact. Also, the officer was allowed to
testify as to the truthfulness of the State's allegations
when in fact he had no personal knowledge as to the
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truthfulness, but, rather, he was relying upon the out
of court testimony of persons not produced at the hearing.

The testimony by Officer Hanks was allowed by
the trial court over numerous objections by Defendant's
Counsel. And, in effect out of court statements and
facts which were not established in court were permitted
by the trial court to be admitted a proof of the truthfulness of the matters asserted in the testimony.
This hearsay testimony was definitely prejudicial
to the defendant as it was not possible to cross-examine
or effectively rebut such testimony.
Part C. The Defendant was denied his Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendment Right to confront
the witnesses against him.
The Court refused to order the alleged owners of
the property to appear and be confronted by the Defendant. The court even refused to allow the Defendant to see any of the allegedly stolen items, or even a list
of such items. Thus, the Defendant was denied his conConstitutally guaranteed right to confront witnesses
against him.
In effect, the Defendant was denied opportunity to
refute the allegations of the State due to the unconstitutional way in which the hearing was conducted.
In the case of State v. Zolantakis, 70 U. 296, 259
p. 1044, (1927), this court has recognized that, "In a
judicial investigation the right of cross examination is
an absolute right and not a mere privilege of the party
9

against whom the witness is called." And the court held
that it was prejudicial error not to allow cross-examination. In this same case the court said that the hearing
must be conducted in accordance to well recognized and
established rules of judicial procedure.
The Defendant was denied this opportunity to
cross-examine witnesses in accordance to accepted judicial procedure.
Part D. The Defendant's Right to Due Process was violated by the manner in which the proceedings of the Hearing were conducted.
It is well established in Utah that a judicial hearing must be held before revocation of probation. Some
of the requirements of due process which must be met
at such hearing are set forth in State v. Bonza, 106 U.
553, 150 P2d 970, ( 1944).
The case of McPhie v. Turner, 10 U2d 237, 351
P2d 91, ( 1960), held that a judicial hearing is required to fulfill the requirements of due process.
Some courts, and evidently the trial court in this
case, (see record of hearing at p. 12), rationalize that
the Defendant's probation is a privilege and that Constitutional rights do not attend the proceedings. However, it is clear from Utah decisions that, that is not the
rule in Utah. (As stated, supra, McPhie v. Turner).
Because as the trial judge stated and enforced his own '
ideas of due process requirements, rather than those
asserted as necessary in the Utah cases, the Defendant ·
in this case was denied due process in the hearing. This
is evident by the trial judge's statement on the record
10
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at p. 11, that the hearing was conducted relative to probation which was a privilege granted to Defendant.
The trial judge's contention is not only contrary to
Utah decisions, supra, but is also illogical. If a hearing
must be held to provide Defendant with his Constitutional rights to due process of law, then the hearing,
once held, cannot be conducted in a manner that would
deprive the Defendant of his Constitutional rights to
due process. There is a definite contradiction in the
trial judges reasoning. And this has resulted in the Defendant's rights to due process of law being violated.
If the hearing is not conducted in accordance with acceptable judicial standards (as required in State v. Zolantakis, supra) and in accordance with due process of
law (as required in McPhie v. Turner, supra) then the
Defendant is in effect denied a judicial hearing.
State v. Zolantakis, supra, states that the right to
personal liberty, ". . . may not be alternately granted
and denial . . . ", (as by revoking probation), " . . .
without just cause." Mr. Knowles, the Defendant has
had his rights to personal liberty denied without just
cause. The required "just cause" could not have been
established in a hearing conducted in the manner in
which the Defendant's hearing was conducted. "Just
cause" must be determined in a court of law where the
Defendant is allowed due process of law.
The hearing for revocation of probation was conducted in a manner which flagrantly abused and violated
the Defendant's right to due process of law.

11

CONCLUSION
The Defendant has had his freedom denied by a
court which did not have proper jurisdiction or power
to make such denial. The granting of the new trial has
never been formally revoked and certainly there are
time limits for such revocation, if in fact it can be made.
Even in civil cases 10 days is the maximum. (Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure 6 ( b) , 59 ( d) ) .
And alternatively, the revocation of the order
granting new trial in criminal cases is not proper. Certainly, when the court has found sufficient grounds for
granting new trial, a mere letter from the prosecution
objecting to new trial, (as was case in Defendant's
trial), cannot be "just cause" which is required by State
v. Zolantakis, supra, in order to deprive a person of his
right to personal liberty.

1
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In addition, the Defendant was denied the necessary due process of law protection which must be afforded to every individual. Defendant's case was prejudiced by illegal search and seizure and by hearsay
testimony. Defendant was also denied the Sixth
Amendment right of confrontation of witnesses. And,
in total, the necessary requirements of due process of ,
law recognized as necessary to deprive an individual of
his personal liberty were notably absent, or grossly
abused and violated.
As Justice Hansen stated in the Zolantakis case,
supra, "the right to personal liberty is one of the most
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sacred and valuable rights of a citizen, and should not
be regarded lightly. The right to personal liberty may
be as valuable to one convicted of a crime as to one not
so convicted, . . . " Accordingly, this right should be
vigorously protected by the courts in probation hearings where the Defendant is subject to having his personal liberty denied.
Utah decisions such as State v. Zolantakis, State v.
Honza, and .McPhie v. Turner, all supra, have protected the Defendant's rights by requiring a judicial proceeding which must determine if there is just cause for
revoking probation. It is inherent in a judicial proceeding that the Defendant's rights to due process are upheld and protected, lest the proceedings become a mockery of justice. A judicial hearing without the requirements of due process of law, is no hearing at all. The
Defendant in this case was, in effect, denied a judicial
hearing because he was denied due process of law protection.
The Defendant urgently petitions this court to uphold his Constitutional Rights and restore his personal
freedom which has unjustly been denied him.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT VAN SCIVER,
Attorney for
Defendant - Appellant.
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